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GAY RIGHTS IN INDIA: MATTER  
OF NAZ FOUNDATION DECISION 
 




On December 12, 2013, the Supreme Court of India upheld a law 
punishing homosexual activity with life imprisonment.1  In so doing, 
India’s Court added to the lively and often contentious debate surrounding 
gay rights both in India and abroad.2  While the decision is a setback for 
India’s homosexual community, it may also illuminate the way to a more 
humane ruling in the future.  
 Indian Penal Code Section 377 criminalizes “unnatural offences” 
and states that “[w]hoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the 
order of nature with any man, woman or animal, shall be punished with 
imprisonment for life . . . and shall also be liable to fine.”3  The High 
Court of Delhi found that Section 377 specifically violated Articles 14, 15 
and 21 of the Indian constitution.4  Article 14 guarantees that the “State 
shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Koushal v. Naz Foundation, Civil Appeal No. 10972 (2013) (India), available at 
http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/ imgs1.aspx?filename=41070 Koushal v. Naz 
Foundation, Civil Appeal No. 10972 (2013) (India), available at 
http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/ imgs1.aspx?filename=41070 Koushal v. Naz 
Foundation, Civil Appeal No. 10972 (2013) (India), available at 
http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/ imgs1.aspx?filename=41070 Koushal v. Naz 
Foundation, Civil Appeal No. 10972 (2013) (India), available at 
http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/ imgs1.aspx?filename=41070.  
2 See Amrita Madhukalya, Rare unity: Religious leaders come out in support of Section 
377, DNA INDIA (December 12, 2013), http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-rare-unity-
religious-leaders-come-out-in-support-of-section-377-1933612; S J Mukhopadhaya, 
Homosexuality is criminal offence: Supreme Court, THE ECONOMIC TIMES (December 
11, 2013), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-12-
11/news/45080584_1_apostolic-churches-alliance-decriminalisation-utkal-christian-
council; UN chief Ban Ki-moon calls for equality for lesbians, gays and bisexuals, THE 
ECONOMIC TIMES (December 12, 2013), 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-12-12/news/45123244_1_lgbt-rights-
ban-ki-moon-human-rights.	  	  
3 16 I.P.C. §377, 1860.  
4 Naz Foundation v. Government of Delhi, WP(C) No. 7455/2001 (Delhi H.C.) (2009) 
(India), available at http://lobis.nic.in/dhe/APS/judgement/02-07-
2009/APS02072009CW74552001.pdf.  




of the laws.”5  Article 15 prohibits state discrimination on the basis of 
“religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.”6  Article 21 guarantees that 
“[n]o person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except 
according to procedure established by law.”7  
This note will present a brief history of this matter before the 
Indian courts, along with a synopsis of the opinion of the Supreme Court 
of India and the ways in which it contrasts with that of the High Court of 
Delhi.  Next, it will discuss the social and legal issues which likely 




I. The Naz Foundation Matter 
The case was instituted by the Naz Foundation (“Naz”),8 a non-
governmental organization based in Delhi dedicated to HIV/AIDS issues.  
Brought originally before the High Court of Delhi and naming Delhi as a 
respondent, the Union of India was joined based on the constitutional 
nature of the matter.9  Alleging that its efforts to prevent HIV/AIDS were 
severely impeded by the societal effects of discriminatory laws, Naz 
sought a declaration that Section 377 was unconstitutional to the extent it 
was applicable to consensual sexual acts done in private, and sought a 
permanent injunction restraining the government from enforcing Section 
377 on three grounds.10  
First, Naz claimed that Section 377 was not equally applied but in 
fact was used as a weapon for police abuse thereby creating a “class of 
vulnerable people . . . continually victimi[z]ed and directly affected by the 
provision.”11  Second, the complaint alleged a right to privacy to be 
implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the 
Indian constitution, and that the pursuit of happiness therein understood 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 INDIA CONST. art. 14. 
6 INDIA CONST. art. 15. 
7 INDIA CONST. art. 21.  
8 The Naz Foundation (India) Trust: Naz India, THE NAZ FOUNDATION (last visited Dec. 
10, 2014), http://nazindia.org/about/naz-india/.  
9 Naz Foundation v. Government of Delhi, WP(C) No. 7455/2001 (Delhi H.C.) (2009) 
(India), available at http://lobis.nic.in/dhe/APS/judgement/02-07-
2009/APS02072009CW74552001.pdf.  
10 Id. ¶ 6. 
11 Id. ¶ 7.  




necessarily includes a right to pursue private, consensual sexual 
relations.12  Finally, Naz alleged that Section 377’s penalizing of 
“unnatural sexual acts”13 was not rationally related to the classification 
created by procreative and non-procreative sexual acts and thus violated 
Article 14 of the Indian constitution.14  Finding constitutional violations 
on each claim, the High Court of Delhi held themselves duty bound to 
invalidate Section 377 and did so accordingly on July 2, 2009, stating that 
their clarification would govern until the legislature amended the law.15 
 
A. The Opinion of the Supreme Court of India 
In an appeal to the Supreme Court of India brought by Suresh 
Kumar Koushal, a citizen of India, and supported on both sides by several 
parties, appellants argued three primary points.  First, that the High Court 
erred in declaring Section 377 violated Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Indian 
constitution as the allegations did not contain “foundational facts 
necessary for pronouncing upon [the] constitutionality of a statutory 
provision.”16  Second, that Section 377 was entitled to the presumption of 
constitutionality since the legislature treated the defined sexual activity as 
an offense, and because Article 21 subjects the rights to life and liberty to 
the procedure prescribed by law.17  Third, that Section 377 is gender 
neutral and did not subject any class of persons to undue discrimination 
which can be said to violate Article 14 or 15.18  
The Supreme Court of India began its opinion by expounding on 
the unique position of Indian courts.  Having gained independence only 
after the cessation of World War II, Indian law remains heavily influenced 
by the system inherited from the British Empire.  Many Indian laws were 
first adopted during that period.  However, India adopted its constitution 
in 1950. Accordingly, Article 13 of the constitution vests courts with the 
power to strike down any law inconsistent with the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Indian constitution, regardless of when the law was first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Id. ¶ 8.  
13 16 I.P.C. §377, 1860.  
14 Naz Foundation v. Government of Delhi, WP(C) No. 7455/2001 ¶ 9 (Delhi H.C.) 
(2009) (India), available at http://lobis.nic.in/dhe/APS/judgement/02-07-
2009/APS02072009CW74552001.pdf.  
15 Id. ¶ 105. 
16 Koushal v. Naz Foundation, Civil Appeal No. 10972 ¶ 21 (2013) (India), available at 
http://judis.nic.in/supreme court/ imgs1.aspx?filename=41070.  
17 Id. ¶ 24.  
18 Id. ¶ 25.  




adopted.19  Further complicating matters, the Court noted that given this 
unique situation, Indian jurisprudence recognized a duty on courts to 
assess the constitutionality of any law with an eye toward the “interpretive 
changes” that might be “affected by the passage of time.”20  In other 
words, laws which may have been constitutional when adopted might be 
viewed as unconstitutional in light of a changed legal or social situation, 
whether the change comes from within Indian society or from outside via 
shifting international norms.21  
Turning to its substantive analysis, the Supreme Court first 
addressed the notion that Section 377 is entitled to a presumption of 
constitutionality.  The Court noted that a plain reading of the constitution 
empowers courts to overturn laws inconsistent with the rights guaranteed 
by the constitution.22  However, the Court also noted the great self-
restraint historically exercised by Indian courts due to concern for a 
separation of powers, and the resulting doctrine of a presumption of 
constitutionality for all laws.23  Continuing, the Court acknowledged a 
significant doctrine of Indian jurisprudence requires courts to uphold laws 
if some reading can render it constitutional.24  Section 377, like all Indian 
laws, was entitled to such a presumption.  
The Supreme Court noted the Indian Penal Code had been 
amended as recently as 2013 to deal specifically with Chapter 16 and 
sexual offenses, of which Section 377 is a part.25  Moreover, it pointed out 
a Law Commission of India report in 2000 specifically recommended 
deletion of Section 377, and that the matter was debated, but ultimately 
not amended.26  The Court felt these facts indicated a strong desire by the 
legislature, as representatives of the people of India, to leave Section 377 
in place.  This notion was further strengthened by the fact that even though 
India was not formally appealing the order of the High Court of Delhi, the 
legislature had not amended the law.27  Opining that it is inappropriate for 
a court to strike down a law absent a clear constitutional violation,28 it next 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 INDIA CONST. art. 13.  
20	  Koushal v. Naz Foundation, Civil Appeal No. 10972 ¶ 54 (2013) (India), available at 
http://judis.nic.in/supreme court/imgs1.aspx?filename=41070. 	  	  
21 Id.  
22 Id. ¶ 51.  
23 Id. ¶¶ 52, 54.  
24 Id. ¶ 57.  
25 Koushal v. Naz Foundation, Civil Appeal No. 10972 ¶ 61 (2013) (India), available at 
http://judis.nic.in/supreme court/imgs1.aspx?filename=41070. 
26 Id.  
27 Id. ¶ 62.  
28 Id.  




examined the historical uses of Section 377 for evidence of such 
violations.  
Noting that sodomy laws in India dated back to 1828, and that 
Section 377 had been adopted in 1860,29 the Supreme Court reviewed its 
application spanning from 1886 to 1992.30  The cases reviewed showed 
that Section 377 had been used to prosecute consensual homosexual 
activity, but also instances of rape and child incest; all under the ambit of 
“carnal intercourse against the order of nature.”31  Therefore, the Court 
concluded that the application was not uniformly discriminatory, and that 
the law was facially neutral.32  
The Court was particularly concerned by the lack of specific 
examples of these alleged violations in Naz’s original petition.  With 
especially harsh words for the Delhi High Court, the Supreme Court stated 
that the petition had been “singularly laconic” and “miserably failed” to 
identify the way(s) that Section 377 singled out any class of persons.33  
Unfortunately, the High Court left itself open to such a charge by 
concluding without any sort of explanation that Section 377 was not 
enacted to prevent any sort of sexual assault and also accepting almost out 
of hand Naz’s contention that Section 377 stymied efforts to prevent 
HIV/AIDS.34 
 Next, the Supreme Court addressed the High Court’s finding of 
Article 14 and 15 violations.  The Court noted the principle underlying 
Article 14 is not that the same laws must apply to all.  Rather, the State has 
the power to identify classes for legislative purposes and even when such 
legislation produces an inequality, the law is “not open to the charge of 
denial of equal protection” so long as it applies to all classes.35  Even 
where it is alleged that a statute is applied unequally, so long as the statute 
is clear in its goals, courts must defer to the administrative bodies tasked 
with carrying it out.  Courts may only strike down such statutes if they 
were clearly crafted to discriminate.36  Referencing again the historical 
usage of Section 377, the Supreme Court held it criminalized an activity, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Id. ¶¶ 67-69.  
30 Id. ¶¶ 69-76.  
31 Id. ¶ 77.  
32 Id.  
33 Id. ¶¶ 78-79.  
34 Naz Foundation v. Government of Delhi, WP(C) No. 7455/2001 ¶ 76 (Delhi H.C.) 
(2009) (India), available at http://lobis.nic.in/dhe/APS/judgement/02-07-
2009/APS02072009CW74552001.pdf.  
35 Id. ¶ 80.  
36 Id. ¶ 81.  




not a class of persons and thus, was not open to charges that it violated 
Article 14 or 15 without further evidence of such charges.37 
 Considering whether Section 377 violated Article 21, the Court 
acknowledged that substantive due process and the right to privacy were 
both guarantees read into the Indian constitution.38  While a certain level 
of privacy and bodily integrity in relation to sexual choices is present in 
Indian law, the Court noted it was also well-established that this is not an 
absolute right but rather may be lawfully restricted as the legislature sees 
fit.39  In so doing, the Supreme Court rejected the High Court of Delhi’s 
more expansive understanding of Article 21, which held that the sphere of 
privacy guards the development of human relations from all but the most 
minimal of outside interference.40  
Next, addressing allegations Section 377 was used to harass a 
certain class of persons, the Court stated that the legislature did not 
mandate or condone such action.  Thus, any harassment was not a 
reflection of the statute itself.41  Noting again the lack of specific instances 
of harassment in the petition, the Court pointed out that while power may 
often be abused, it was not in a position to deny the existence of said 
power without a concrete showing of such abuse.42  Even in instances, 
such as this one, where the existence of harassment is likely, the legal 
standard involved called for concrete examples.   
 Concluding, the Court wrote that while the plight of homosexuals 
was real and their rights must be protected, their plight could not be a 
blindfold to overturn properly enacted legislation on constitutional 
grounds.  The Supreme Court thus overruled the High Court of Delhi, 
holding Section 377 constitutional on all grounds.43  After doing so, the 
Court’s final words were to “make it clear that this Court has merely 
pronounced on the correctness of the view taken by the Delhi High Court 
on the constitutionality of Section 377” and that the legislature was free to 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Id. ¶ 84.  
38 Id. ¶¶ 85-88.  
39 Id. ¶ 90.  
40 Id. ¶¶ 39-40.  
41 Koushal v. Naz Foundation, Civil Appeal No. 10972 ¶ 91 (2013) (India), available at 
http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/ imgs1.aspx?filename=41070.  
42 Id.  
43 Id. ¶ 97.  
44 Id. ¶¶ 97-98.  




II. Analysis of the Naz Foundation Matter 
The Naz Foundation cases show an Indian judiciary and society at 
large wrestling with several competing interests at once.  India is the 
world’s second largest nation by population, and the world’s largest 
democracy.45  Homosexuality is a hotly debated topic,46 but there are clear 
signs that Indian society and its leaders are moving in the direction of full 
rights for all.47  
As proof, we need look no further than the opinion of the High 
Court of Delhi in this matter.  India’s judiciary is set up such that state 
high courts (Delhi is not only a city, but a state as well) are but one step 
removed from the Supreme Court of India.  The High Court’s opinion is 
equivalent to that of a United States Court of Appeals.  The opinion relies 
in no small part on the ever growing international norm of equal rights 
regardless of orientation, as evidenced by its heavy referencing of 
international documents and court opinions.48  With that said, the opinion 
is not without pleas to the unique characteristics of Indian society and their 
own constitution for its final ruling.  With its allusions to a growing sphere 
of personal privacy in Indian society, the important primacy of 
constitutional morality versus a social-majoritarian morality, and its 
appeal for strict scrutiny of laws which affect certain classes more heavily; 
it is characteristic of an evolving social consciousness in India similar to 
that which has taken hold in the global West, and which recognizes a 
greater primacy for the individual.  
Conversely, the Supreme Court opinion is perhaps best viewed as 
that of a judiciary which wishes not to be dragged in to debates that it sees 
as properly adjudicated in the legislative sphere, regardless of the social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 UN Country Profile: India, UNITED NATIONS, 
https://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=INDIA (last visited Dec. 10, 2014).  
46 See Soutik Biswas, Fear and loathing in gay India, BBCNEWS (May 17, 2005), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4304081.stm; Shyamantha Asokan, India’s 
Supreme Court turns the clock back with gay sex ban, REUTERS (December 11, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/11/us-india-rights-gay-
idUSBRE9BA05620131211.  
47 See Randeep Ramesh, India’s Literary Elite Call for Anti-Gay Law to be Scrapped, 
THE GUARDIAN (September 18, 2006), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/sep/18/gayrights.books; Kounteya Sinha, 
Ramadoss to take up gay rights with issue with PM, THE TIMES OF INDIA (January 20, 
2011), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/ Ramadoss-to-take-up-gay-rights-issue-
with-PM/articleshow/3545889.cms?referral=PM.  
48 Naz Foundation v. Government of Delhi, WP(C) No. 7455/2001 ¶¶ 25-28 (Delhi 
H.C.) (2009) (India), available at http://lobis.nic.in/dhe/APS/judgement/02-07-
2009/APS02072009CW74552001.pdf.  




merits of the debate, unless it has a proper evidentiary foundation to do so.  
The Supreme Court opinion is emblematic of extreme judicial deference to 
the legislature, justified additionally by a presumption of constitutionality.  
Both of these canons of statutory interpretation are recognizable in our 
own judicial system.  Despite the unfortunate result of the case from a 
rights perspective, the canons themselves are not readily dismissed.  
Further, where such interpretive canons exist it is all the more necessary to 
have a solid foundation for allegations of unconstitutionality.  
This foundation, or the lack thereof, seems to have been the 
deciding factor in this case.  It is no coincidence that both Naz’s original 
petition and the appeal opened with factual allegations.  For Naz, that 
Section 377 was applied in a discriminatory manner.  For Koushal, that the 
petition did not contain a sufficient foundation to decide on the 
constitutionality of Section 377. It is similarly no coincidence that the 
Supreme Court’s opinion repeatedly referenced this and took great issue 
with the Naz petitions’ claim that Section 377 hindered their efforts to 
curb HIV/AIDS prevalence in India while not detailing specific instances 
of such hindrances.  Acknowledging that it was a high bar to cross, and 
even noting that homosexuals in India were discriminated against, the 
Court likely still felt that in order to make such a momentous ruling it 
needed a solid evidentiary foundation for the case and absent such 
specifics, it seems Naz’s petition was viewed as simply too infirm to 
declare Section 377 unconstitutional on its face.  
Unlike the High Court of Delhi, the Supreme Court relied less on 
international precedent for its opinion than in some of their prior 
decisions.49 While the Court has taken valid criticism for this,50 it is likely 
a mistake to conclude either that the Indian Court is turning its back on 
international precedent or shutting the door on gay rights in India.  The 
Supreme Court did not countenance its opinion on a refutation of the 
views of the High Court of Delhi, but instead relied on a narrow factual 
finding in conjunction with established judicial precedent.  In so doing 
though, the opinion implicitly acknowledges that India’s homosexual 
community is likely discriminated against and makes reference to courts’ 
Article 13 duty to find laws such as Section 377 unconstitutional where 
specific cases support such allegations.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 See, Vishaka v. Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011 (India).  
50 See, Rehan Abeyratne and Nilesh Sinha, Insular and Inconsistent: India’s Naz 
Foundation Judgment in Comparative Perspective, YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW ONLINE (May 1, 2014), http://www.yjil.org/ docs/pub/o-39-abeyratneandsinha-
insular-and-inconsistent-indias-naz-foundation.pdf.  




Taken as a whole, the Naz Foundation cases show a judiciary both 
aware of and sensitive to the precarious situation homosexuals in India 
face because of Section 377, but not yet prepared to take a firm stand on 
the issue without a rock solid case on which to build their constitutional 
opinion.  However, the opinion can simultaneously be seen as a blueprint 
for the way to prepare the Court to take such a stand.  The Naz Foundation 
has taken note of this implied blueprint, and has filed an appeal in the case 
with an eye toward remedying precisely this shortcoming.51 
 
Conclusion 
The holding of the Supreme Court of India is unfortunate but 
should not be viewed as the final word on the matter.  Indeed, while 
certainly disheartening to many both in India and abroad, the Court’s 
opinion can simultaneously be read as pointing the way for the ultimate 
declaration that Section 377 is unconstitutional. 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 See The Naz Foundation (India) Trust: Advocacy, THE NAZ FOUNDATION (last visited 
Dec. 10, 2014), http://nazindia.org/programs/advocacysection-377/.  
